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QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY: ITS SCOPE AND
LIMITATIONS IN SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
It has been apparent during the past two years that the principle
that no man is above the law remains "the pride and glory of Anglo-
American common law."1 It is clear that the principle is intact in the
criminal law; however, the competing doctrine of sovereign immunity
for public officials creates a greater degree of complexity in the civil law.
It is unquestionable that on many occasions a public official who has
been deemed liable, and against whom someone has a valid civil claim,
will be protected from civil liability by sovereign immunity. The ques-
tion of most interest to those who may have been injured by the action
of a public official is, of course, who is protected by sovereign immunity
and to what actions does it extend.2
Traditionally the scope of immunity for public officials has been a
function of the type of acts performed by the governmental officer
concerned.' This Note deals with what have generally been called
quasi-judicial officers, those who in broad terms have been regarded as
exercising the same sorts of discretionary powers as do judges.4  Includ-
ed within that classification have been, such officers as prosecuting
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
W. HOLDSWORTn, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1st ed. 1927) [hereinafter cited
as HOLDSWORTH];
W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].
1. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263
(1937). The most obvious examples of the application of the principle are, of course,
the cases of President Nixon and Vice President Agnew, both from the executive branch.
The trial of Florida Senator Edward Gurney, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1975, at 38, col.
1, and the scandal involving the Florida Supreme Court, see id., Apr. 27, 1975, § 1, at
37, col. 1, are indications of problems of a similar nature in the legislative and judicial
branches.
2. The general question has been the subject of extensive writing by a number of
scholars. See, e.g., Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental
Wrongs, 44 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1 (1972); Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47
CALIF. L. REv. 303 (1959); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage
Actions, 77 HARv. L. REv. 209 (1963); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1963); James, Tort Liability of Government
Units and Their Officers, 22 U. C-I. L. REv. 610 (1955); Jennings, supra note 1. See
also PROSSER § 132, at 987 n.74.
3. The rank or title of an official has not been regarded as significant in
determining whether official immunity is applicable. Note, Official Immunity in Ohio:
How to Sue the King's Men, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 557, 560 (1974).
4. See Jennings, supra note 1, at 276 n.51.
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attorneys, clerks of court, parole board members, and prison officials.'
The model of the prosecutor's immunity will be used in this Note as a
vehicle to examine the application and scope of official immunity for
such quasi-judicial officers. The considerations which are involved in
that analysis are basic ones, however, and the discussion should be
relevant to each of the other officers as well.6 The precise question that
will be examined is the degree of protection to be afforded a quasi-
judicial state official in a "constitutional tort" action based on section
1983. r That section appears to create, in unconditional language, a
civil remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights by state or local
officers. The Supreme Court has dealt with the same question with
5. The quasi-judicial immunity doctrine developed in the early American case law
in the context of common law tort actions. See, e.g., Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117,
44 N.E, 1001 (1896) (malicious prosecution); Stewart v. Case, 53 Minn. 62, 54 N.W.
938 (1893) (assessor valuing property for taxes); Sweeney v. Young, 82 N.H. 159, 131
A. 155 (1925) (school board dismissing a pupil). See also Parker v. Kirkland, 298 IIl.
App. 340, 18 N.E.2d 709 (1939) (defamation action against member of tax board of
appeals).
A majority of the cases today involve 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Cases have
involved clerks of court, Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1973); Smith v.
Rosenbaum, 460 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1972); Davis v. McAteer, 431 F.2d 81 (8th Cir.
1970); Stewart v. Minnick, 409 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1969), jurors, White v. Hegerhorse,
418 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 912 (1970); Roberts v. Barbosa,
227 F. Supp. 20 (S.D. Cal. 1964), justices of the peace, Mississippi ex rel. Giles v.
Thomas, 464 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1972); Pennebaker v. Chamber, 437 F.2d 66 (3d Cir.
1971); Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1967), and administrative personnel of
the courts, Lucarell v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972); Gillibeau v. Richmond,
417 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1969); Peckham v. Scanlon, 241 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1957). But
see Stevenson v. Sanders, 311 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Ky. 1970) (prison officials); United
States ex rel. Smith v. Heil, 308 F. Supp. 106.3 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (parole boards). See
note 54 infra for cases dealing with prosecuting attorneys. See also Burkes v. Callion,
433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971); Allison v. California
Adult Authority, 419 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1969); Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642 (9th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 990 (1969) (parole boards); Sarelas v. Sheehan, 353
F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1965); Bartlett v. Weimer, 268 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 938 (1960); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(appointees of court); Ransom v. Philadelphia, 311 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(prison officials).
6. The model of prosecutorial immunity is an appropriate one, since courts may
look to the role of the prosecutor as a standard against which other quasi-judicial
functions can be assessed. For instance, in Bricker v. Michigan Parole Bd., 18 CluM. L.
REP. 2362 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 1975), a federal court held that parole board members
are absolutely immune from section 1983 actions because they act "as an arm of the
sentencing judge, just as prosecuting attorneys act in a quasi-judicial capacity in bringing
criminal actions." Id. at 2363.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The statute reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
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respect to legislators, s judges,9 and executive officials, 10 and has heard
oral arguments in a case involving a state prosecutor." While the case
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The act was originally passed in 187L Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
8. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See notes 21-22 infra and
accompanying text.
9. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
10. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). See notes 28 & 30 infra and
accompanying text.
11. Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 945
(1975). See notes 40-46 infra and accompanying text. The case was argued on
November 3, 1975. 44 U.S.L.W. 3273 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1975).
Ed. Note. As this Note went to press, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Cir-
cuit opinion in Imbler, granting state prosecutors absolute immunity under section 1983.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 44 U.S.L.W. 4250 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976). The Court noted that
"[tihe public trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrained in mak-
ing every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit
for damages." Id. at 4255.
Time considerations prevent an extensive analysis of the Court's decision; however,
several observations can be offered. The general issue of quasi-judicial immunity has
not been settled by the decision. The Court did not focus on the nature of the quasi-
judicial officer's duties. Rather, it was concerned with the special role the prosecutor
plays in the judicial system. By treating the prosecutor as sui generis, the Court has
provided little insight into the degree of immunity to be afforded other quasi-judicial of-
ficials.
Insofar as prosecutorial immunity is concerned, several points made in Imbler
should be examined. First, discussion of the impact of Scheuer upon the entire im-
munity issue is conspicuously absent. As noted below, Scheuer, in providing executive
officers with only a qualified immunity, represented a break with previous cases which
had extended absolute immunity to executive officials. See notes 14-17 infra and accom-
panying text. In Scheuer, however, the Court cited the same basic policy reasons which
had previously been used to support absolute immunity. See note 36 infra. The Imbler
decision appears to rest essentially on public policy grounds. See 44 U.S.L.W. 4250,
4254-55 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976). The only attempt to distinguish the prosecutor from other
executive officials is made in a few lines which indicate that a prosecutor is "[fire-
quently acting under serious constraints of time and even information, . . . [and is] re-
sponsible annually for hundreds of indictments and trials," and that consequently there
is greater opportunity for making decisions which "could engender colorable claims of
constitutional deprivation." Id. at 4255. The Scheuer Court, however, recognized that
executive officers, too, must "often act swiftly and firmly . . . [and] . . . are entitled
to rely on traditional sources for the factual information on which they decide and act."
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246 (1974). Furthermore, never before have courts
considered the frequency of potential claims to be a significant factor in distinguishing
the type of immunity to be afforded public officials; policemen, for instance, subject
themselves daily to such potential actions. Rather, the emphasis has been on the nature
of the activity performed. On these terms, the public policy rationale breaks down as
a means of distinguishing one official's immunity from another's. See notes 63-64 infra
and accompanying text. Mr. Justice White makes the same point in his concurring opin-
ion in Imbler, although he does articulate one policy reason which permitted him to con-
cur: the possibility of injury to the governmental decision-making process from the
threat of suit. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4258-59. Certainly the officials considered in the
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involving the prosecutor is directly related to the issues to be considered
here, those concerning judges and executive officials are also of key
importance, for the crux of the problem is whether quasi-judicial offi-
cials should be afforded an absolute immunity from suit, as are judges, 12
or whether they should be protected by a qualified immunity, such as
that shielding executive officials. 3
Until 1974, there was no real difficulty in ascertaining the scope of
the immunity available to quasi-judicial officials in section 1983 actions.
In that year, however, the Supreme Court decided in Scheuer v.
Rhodes'4 that even the highest executive officials of a state' 5 were
protected, not by an absolute immunity, but by a qualified immunity in
section 1983 suits. The reasons advanced in Scheuer for the granting of
a qualified immunity to high executive officials were similar to the
"basic policy considerations" which support immunity for judicial and
Scheuer case are deeply involved in the governmental decision-making process, however,
and the Court there felt that qualified immunity was adequate.
Second, the Court stated that if a prosecutor were afforded only qualified immunity
there would be an "adverse effect upon the functioning of the criminal justice system."
Id. at 4255. The focus is thereby shifted from the traditional rationale for quasi-judicial
immunity dealing with the nature of the prosecutor's functions to considerations dealing
with the protection of the system. Extending absolute immunity on this basis would
exceed limits heretofore established by the courts. See note 134 infra. To be consistent,
absolute immunity would also have to be extended to protect defense attorneys from mal-
practice suits based on their actions during the trial, as under the English rule which
has not been followed in this country. See note 134 infra. Moreover, shifting the focus
away from the nature of the acts performed operates to carve out an exception for the
prosecutor, making it difficult, if not impossible, to extend the Court's rationale to other
quasi-judicial officers who are not as closely connected to the criminal justice system.
Third, the Court notes that even though a prosecutor is absolutely immune from
civil suit, he still may be criminally liable and may be disciplined by an association of
his peers. 44 U.S.LW. at 4256. As to criminal liability, other executive officials are,
of course, equally susceptible. The availability of professional discipline as a remedy
may deter future misconduct, but it does not provide the victim of misconduct with the
type of redress contemplated by section 1983.
In light of the difficulty in extending the Imbler rationale to other quasi-judicial
officials, and the fact that Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3120 (U.S. Sept. 9, 1975), is still pending before the Court, it
seems apparent that the issue of quasi-judicial immunity is far from being settled.
12. See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
13, See notes 29-35 infra and accompanying text.
14, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
15. The Scheuer Court did not address the question of whether an absolute or a
qualified immunity is available to high-ranking federal officials in tort actions. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has since held that high officials of the
United States Department of Justice did not enjoy an absolute immunity from section
1983 liability for their participation in law enforcement activities in the District. Apton




legislative officials as well; 16 nevertheless, the Supreme Court decided on
a qualified immunity. In so doing, it signaled the end of a trend toward
absolute immunity for virtually all government officers which had devel-
oped during the first two thirds of the twentieth century.' 7
The question after Scheuer is how far the implication of that
decision-that the traditional policy reasons for immunity from tort.
liability justify only a qualified immunity-will reach outside the execu-
tive branch of government. Indeed, one might argue persuasively that
the immunity of judges (or of legislators) should be qualified, since the
same rationale is advanced as in the case of executive officials.' That
argument, however, is foreclosed unless the Supreme Court reconsiders
its prior pronouncements. 9 There is thus an absolute immunity for
judges in section 1983 actions, but only a qualified immunity for state
executive officers. The issue of the scope of immunity for quasi-judicial
officials is squarely at the point of conflict between traditional judicial
immunity and the restricted immunity contemplated in Scheuer. The
outcome of the debate over which camp officials like prosecuting attor-
neys are to occupy will not only have considerable significance in its
own right, but may provide an indication of how far the courts are
willing to extend the rationale of Scheuer.
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL LIABILITY:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A public officer's defense of immunity from civil suit may be
either absolute or qualified. An absolute immunity protects a defendant
16. Note, Official Immunity, supra note 3, at 577.
17. See note 37 infra and accompanying text. The reversal was foreshadowed in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, on remand, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d
Cir. 1972). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Court had already
held, in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), that policemen were protected by a
qualified immunity. Policemen have traditionally been treated in a separate category
from other executive officials, however, insofar as immunity from civil suit is concerned.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 244-45 (1974).
18. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896); see Note, Official Immunity, supra
note 3, at 560.
19. The absolute immunity of judges in section 1983 suits was reaffirmed in Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The Court upheld absolute immunity for legislators in
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
20. There are conflicting views on whether such a defense is properly termed an
"immunity" or a "privilege." Professor Engdahl, for example, contends that the use of
the term "immunity" is improper because that concept goes to a court's jurisdiction
rather than to the merits of the claim. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 41 n.195. Conversely,
Dean Prosser argues that "immunity" is more satisfactory since the concept "avoids
liability in tort under all circumstances, within the limits of the immunity itself; and is




without regard to his purpose, motive, or the reasonableness of his
conduct. The protection of a qualified immunity depends upon the
defendant's good faith and the reasonableness of his behavior. Whether
a public official is protected by absolute or qualified immunity depends
upon what office he holds and what functions he performs. Legislators,
for example, enjoy an absolute immunity when acting within the scope
of their legislative duties, 21 and such immunity is explicitly conferred on
federal congressmen by the Constitution "for any Speech or Debate in
either House. '2 2  It is equally well settled that the immunity afforded
judges for official acts is absolute despite the absence of a constitutional
provision comparable to the one protecting legislators. 23  Absolute, im-
munity in this context, however, presents a unique problem owing to the
fact that the immunity has been said to be available not only to judges,
but also to "judicial officers. 24  Just who fills the role of a "judicial
officer" is not clear.25  On the other hand, it has been held that
executive officers are not protected by absolute immunity; even at
common law their protection is only qualified, the immunity granted
being a function of the amount of discretion in decision-making which a
particular officer possesses. 8
Although a contrary result has been urged,27 it is also clear that
these same common law immunities protect government officials in
. . . defendant . . . ." PnossnnR 970. The term "immunity" is used throughout this
Note, since it is the term that most courts have used in recent years. See, e.g., Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320-22 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
238 (1974).
21. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (holding that the common law
doctrine protects legislators independently of constitutional provisions). See also Ex
parte Wason, L.R. 4 Q.B. 573 (1869); Dillon v. Balfour, 20 L.R. Ir. 600 (Ex. 1887).
22. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6. This section has been broadly construed by the courts.
See Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343
(D.D.C. 1960) (absolute immunity in defamation suit based on written extensions of
Congressman's remarks in Congressional Record appendix). Similar provisions are
contained in many state constitutions. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 375 n.5
(1951) (enumerating state constitutional provisions).
23. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Randall v. Brigham, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868); Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 129 (1849).
24. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
25. Indeed, this ambiguity contributes to the problem of the scope of quasi-judicial
immunity. See notes 103-29 infra and accompanying text.
26. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). After pointing out that both
legislative and judicial immunity had deep roots in the common law, the Court stated
that "[tihe immunity of the Crown has traditionally been of a more limited nature." Id.
at 239 n.4.
27. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558-59 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see
Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray
[Vol. 1976:95
QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
actions based on section 1983.28 Scheuer v. Rhodes29 stands out among
the cases which have extended common law immunities to section 1983
actions because the Court held for the first time that state executive
officials are protected only by a qualified immunity. Indeed, as late as
1959 it had been held that all executive officials were protected by
absolute immunity in defamation suits.3 0
The Scheuer case arose out of the civil disorder at Kent State
University in 1970. Section 1983 actions were brought against, inter
alia, the Governor of Ohio by the personal representatives of the estates
of three students who died in the disorder. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed a dismissal of the complaints,"1 but the Supreme
Court reversed. 2  After noting that "[the immunity of the Crown has
Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 615 (1970). Professor Kates cites congressional
debates to argue that the issue of liability imposed by section 1983 was identical to that
of the criminal liability imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 242. Id. at 621-22. After noting that
on at least two occasions amendments to delete the imposition of criminal liability of
state judges were unsuccessfully introduced, the author concludes that "the proposition
that § 1983 leaves the common law of judicial immunity intact (while the statute upon
which it was consciously modeled abrogates it) approaches the incredible." Id. at 622-
23. But see Comment, Federal Comity, Official Immunity, and the Dilemma of Section
1983, 1967 DUKE LJ. 741, 778 (at least "some inferential support for judicial immunity"
in the debates). See also Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79
YALE L.J. 322 (1969). The conflicting interpretations of the debate indicate that it is
extremely difficult to determine congressional intent from legislative history. Cf. Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 291
(1935).
28. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975) (executives); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1974) (executives); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators). In all the cases it was
emphasized that there were strong common law traditions supporting the immunity and
that if Congress had intended to abrogate those immunities by the passage of section
1983 it would have specifically so provided. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55
(1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). In Tenney the Court even
considered it a big assumption that Congress has the constitutional power to limit the
freedom of state legislators acting within the sphere of their duties. Id. at 376.
29. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
30. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576 (1959). The same conduct which is the basis
of a common law defamation action can support a section 1983 suit when it is alleged
that the dissemination of slanderous remarks makes it impossible for a defendant to
receive a fair trial. See Williams v. Gorton, Civil No. 74-2627 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 1976).
Although Barr dealt with federal officials and Scheuer was concerned with state
officials, the distinction is not significant for immunity purposes. See Apton v. Wilson,
506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also McManis, Personal Liability of State Officials
Under State and Federal Law, 9 GA. L. Rv. 821, 832-33, 836 n.70 (1975).
31. 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972).
32. The Court's reversal was based not only on the section 1983 claim, but also on
the circuit court's holding that the claim was blocked by the eleventh amendment. 416
U.S. at 237-38. That amendment provides that "[tihe Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law and equity, commenced or
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traditionally been of a more limited nature [than that afforded legisla-
tors and judges]"3 and that police officers have never been shielded by
absolute immunity, 4 the Court concluded that the Governor, as a high
executive official, would have less protection than the legislator or judge
but more protection than the police officer. The quantum of protection
the executive officers would receive depended upon several factors: (1)
the scope of the official's discretion and responsibility; (2) all the
circumstances surrounding a particular incident; (3) the reasonable-
ness of the official's action; and (4) a good faith belief that the action
was proper.8 5
It is apparent that the Scheuer decision does not extend so far as to
reach officials who are protected by either judicial or legislative immuni-
ty.36 It is equally obvious, however, that Scheuer undermines the
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State .... ." While
the amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a state by its own citizens, the
Supreme Court has consistently held that an unconsenting state is immune from suits
brought in federal courts by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state. See
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Court has also recognized that a suit may
not be brought in many cases where the state itself is not a named party.
It is ...well established that even though a State is not named a party to
the action, the suit may nonetheless be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, . . . the Court said: "[W]hen
the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the
state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its
sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974), quoting Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
The Scheuer Court held that the complaint involved in the case at bar was not directed
at the state, but at the individual defendants, and that the state was not the real party in
interest. 416 U.S. at 238.
33. 416 U.S. at 239-40 n.4. The Scheuer Court was not the first to look to the
common law to support absolute immunity for judges. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-54 (1967); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). In so doing,
the Scheuer Court was able to circumvent the difficulty of explaining on policy grounds
why judges receive a stepped-up immunity that executive officials do not enjoy.
34. 416 U.S. at 244-45.
35. Id. at 247-48. It is significant that the Court pointed out that section 1983
"would be drained of meaning were we to hold that the acts of a governor or other high
executive officer have 'the quality of supreme and unchangeable edict, overriding all
conflicting rights of property and unreviewable through the judicial power of the Federal
Government.' Id. at 248. Nevertheless, the sliding scale of immunity would appear to
provide high-ranking executive officials, such as governors, with almost absolute protec-
tion.
36. It is the Court's footnote reference to the different common law basis of judicial
immunity that makes it "apparent" that the decision would not reach judges. See note
33 supra and accompanying text. It would be far from apparent without that footnote
that the decision would not affect judicial immunity insofar as the same policy reasons
which had supported absolute immunity for judicial officials were used by the Court to
support the limited immunity for executives. See note 63 infra. Cf. Spalding v. Vilas,
161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
[Vol. 1976:95
QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
rationale of previous decisions which had extended absolute immunity
into the executive branch.3 7  Those cases held that "the same general
considerations of public policy and convenience ' '3 8 which provided ab-
solute judicial immunity applied to executive officials.3" Judicial im-
munity thus provided the foundation from which absolute executive
immunity began. Scheuer, then, must be read to mean the extension
has gone too far, and that absolute judicial immunity should be confined
to its original boundaries so as to protect only "judicial officers." The
difficulty now is in staking out the boundaries of the appropriate class of
"judicial officers."
The Development of Quasi-Judicial Immunity
The problems in the area of quasi-judicial immunity are vividly
revealed in two recent court of appeals decisions which reached conflict-
ing results in similar fact situations. In Imbler v. Pachtman,4 ° the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a state prosecutor was absolutely
immune from a section 1983 civil suit. The plaintiff, Imbler, had been
convicted of murder in 1961. After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a
writ of habeas corpus in the state courts, his petition was finally granted
37. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483
(1896); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950).
38. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
39. Spalding involved an allegation that the Postmaster General had maliciously
caused the plaintiff to suffer $100,000 in damages. While holding that the Postmaster
General was absolutely immune from civil suit, the Court limited its opinion to heads of
executive departments. Id. at 498.
Spalding was extended by Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied. 339 U.S. 949 (1950), a decision which, though not from the Supreme Court, was
"in addition to being considered a landmark by other lower courts, . . . appear[ed] to be
so regarded by the Supreme Court." Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129, 132 n.5 (1st Cir.
1965).
The defendants in Gregoire were two successive attorneys general of the United
States, two successive directors of the Enemy Alien Control Unit of the Department of
Justice, and the District Director of Immigration at Ellis Island. The two attorneys
general were the only ones of the five who were heads of executive departments. The
other three defendants were lower echelon executive officials who, nevertheless, were
deemed to be shielded from civil suit, regardless of their motives. 177 F.2d at 580. For
a listing of earlier cases which supported the Gregoire holding, see id. at 581 n.11.
Gregoire was echoed in Barr. The plurality stated flatly that it did not think "the
principle announced in Vilas can properly be restricted to executive officers of cabinet
rank. . ..." citing several lower court opinions in support of that view. 360 U.S. at 572
& n.9. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan wrote stinging dissents, objecting to
the extension of Spalding v. Vilas to low-ranking executive officials. Id. at 583, 587.
The effect of these three decisions was clearly to protect any government official who
exercised discretion in decision-making.
40. 500 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 945 (1975).
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by a federal district court more than eight years later.4 The basis for
the federal court's holding was that Imbler's conviction had been se-
cured in part by testimony the prosecutor knew, or had strong reason to
know, was perjured. 2
Imbler brought a suit against the prosecutor for damages based on
section 1983. There was no question that the prosecutor's actions, as
found by the district court in the habeas corpus proceedings, violated the
defendant's right to due process of law under the fourteenth amend-
ment.43  The district court nevertheless dismissed the complaint, hold-
ing that a prosecuting attorney was protected by an absolute immunity
for acts committed "in the performance of duties constituting an integral
part of the judicial process."" The court held further that the actions
by Prosecutor Pachtman undoubtedly were within his prosecutorial
duties since the constitutional violation occurred during the questioning
of witnesses and the presentation of testimony at trial.45 The dismissal
was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 6
The second case was Hilliard v. Williams from the Sixth Circuit. 47
Mrs. Hilliard, too, had been convicted of murder. The conviction was
reversed on the grounds that the prosecutor had withheld evidence from
the trial which he knew would be exculpatory. Moreover, the prosecu-
tor had presented "false and misleading" testimony related to the same
piece of evidence.48
Mrs. Hilliard was subsequently retried, the exculpatory evidence
was introduced, and she was acquitted. She then brought a section
1983 action against the prosecutor, contending that he had violated her
41. Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969), af'd sub nom. Imbler v.
California, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970).
42. 298 F. Supp, at 800.
43. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (conviction procured by
state through knowing use of perjured testimony and withholding of exculpatory evidence
"is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like
result by intimidation"); accord, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v.
Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
44. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301, 1302 (9th Cir. 1974).
45. See id. at 1302-03.
46. 500 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974).
47. 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1975).
48. The evidence involved was a blood-stained jacket and some blood-stained cur-
tains. The State alleged that the blood was that of the murder victim. Prior to trial
both items were sent to the FBI laboratory in Washington for analysis. The lab
returned a report indicating that the blood on the two items was not human blood.
Neither the report nor the jacket and curtains were introduced into evidence at the trial.
The prosecutor, moreover, allowed testimony to the effect that the blood appeared to be




right to due process. As in the Imbler case, the district judge originally
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the prosecutor was absolute-
ly immune from suit.49  After a series of appeals and remands,50 the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "[i]t is most
emphatically not within the scope of a prosecuting attorney's duties to
withhold exculpatory evidence and to direct witnesses to give misleading
and deceptive testimony."5 1
Most of the lower courts which have dealt with the problem of
prosecutorial immunity from suit under section 1983 have held that the
protection is absolute. 52  The Hilliard case stands alone among fed-
eral court of appeals decisions in explicitly holding that a bad faith
act, even in the course of a trial, may lead to section 1983 liability."3
49. Id. at 1348.
50. The case originally reached the court of appeals in 1972, 465 F.2d 1212 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1029 (1972), where it reversed the district court's decision
on quasi-judicial immunity and remanded. On remand, the district court concluded that
the prosecutor's acts had not been shown to be the proximate cause of Mrs. Hilliard's
conviction, see 516 F.2d at 1349, and that his conduct had thus not deprived her of any
constitutional right. On appeal from this holding, the Sixth Circuit again reversed,
holding that the plaintiff's constitutional rights had in fact been violated, id., and
reaffirming that immunity was no defense. Id. at 1350. The prosecutor, District
Attorney General John L. Williams, filed a petition for certiorari on August 21, 1975. 44
U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975). The petition for certiorari of his co-defendant,
Tennessee Bureau of Criminal Investigation Agent Donn Clark, was denied. 44
U.S.L.W. 3391 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1976).
51. 516 F.2d at 1350.
52. See, e.g. Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1975) (false imprison-
ment); Duba v. McIntyre, 501 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1974) (malicious prosecution and
false arrest); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974) (illegal wiretap and
use of perjured testimony); Guerrero v. Barlow, 494 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1974) (false
imprisonment); United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972)
(use of false evidence); Madison v. Gerstein, 440 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1971) (malicious
prosecution and false arrest); Arensman v. Brown, 430 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1970)
(plaintiff seeking injunction from prosecution); Dacey v. New York County Lawyers'
Ass'n, 423 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970) (denial of
freedom of speech); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
846 (1970) (use of perjured testimony); Marlowe v. Coakley, 404 F.2d 70 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1968) (use of perjured testimony and withholding exculpato-
ry evidence before grand jury); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967) (deprivation of liberty and denial of right to speedy trial).
53. In Weathers v. Ebert, 505 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1974), the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted the holding in Hilliard and stated that "Hilliard represents a real, but very
limited, departure from the traditional rule of prosecutorial immunity." Id. at 516. The
court did not have to decide whether to follow Hilliard, however, since the complaint in
the case was broad enough to include merely negligent, as well as malicious, behavior by
the prosecutor. Id. Dicta in a recent Second Circuit decision indicate that that court
may no longer grant absolute immunity for any prosecutorial functions. Martin v.
Merola, Civil No. 75-7113 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1976).
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The foundation for an absolute prosecutorial immunity in section
1983 actions was established by the 1926 decision of the Second Circuit
in Yaselli v. Golf.54 The complaint in Yaselli was based on an allegedly
malicious prosecution by a special assistant to the United States Attor-
ney General. In holding that the defendant was absolutely immune
from suit, the court indicated that among the "weighty reasons" why the
prosecutor should be protected "in the proper discharge of . . . [his]
official duties" was the fact that his duties were of a judicial nature and
that the due execution thereof depended upon his own judgment.55
Drawing support from the immunity protecting justices of the peace,
grand jurors, and participants in judicial proceedings, the court conclud-
ed that the same considerations dictated a similar protection for the
Unifted States attorney in the case before it. "A United States attorney,
if not a judicial officer, is at least a quasi judicial officer, of the govern-
ment. He exercises important judicial functions, and is engaged in the
enforcement of the law." 56
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Yaselli decision. 57
Judge Learned Hand wrote many years later that the Yaselli affirmance
made the conclusion inevitable that "officers of the Department of
Justice, when engaged in prosecuting private persons, enjoy the same
absolute privilege as judges." It should be recognized, however, that
the Supreme Court action came during the period when absolute im-
munity was the rule for officials of all branches of government. 59 The
fact that the Yaselli affirmance was granted summarily, coupled with the
reversal of the trend toward across-the-board absolute immunity evi-
54. 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927). Yaselli was
certainly not the first case to provide the prosecutor with absolute immunity, however.
Many state court decisions had so held. See Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E.
1001 (1896), where is was stated that "[n]o public officer is responsible in a civil suit
for a judicial determination, however erroneous it may be, and however malicious the
motive which produced it." Id. at 121, 44 N.E. at 1002, quoting J. ToWNSHEND, A
TR.ATIsE ON TrE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER & LIBEL § 227, at 396 (3d ed. 1877); cf.
Carpenter v. Sibley, 153 Cal. 215, 94 P. 879 (1908) (malicious prosecution); Arnold v.
Hubble, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 947, 38 S.W. 1041 (1897) (where however, the suggestion is
clear that if the prosecutor acted maliciously he would be liable); Schneider v. Shepherd,
192 Mich. 82, 158 N.W. 182 (1916) (false imprisonment). See also Smith v. Parman,
101 Kan. 115, 165 P. 663 (1917) (malicious prosecution); Kittler v. Kelsch, 56 N.D.
227, 216 N.W. 898 (1927) (malicious prosecution); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Ore. 641, 228
P. 135 (1924) (malicious prosecution); Annot., 56 A.L.R. 1255 (1928).
55. 12 F.2d at 399.
56. Id. at 404.
57. 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
58. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 580 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950). See cases cited in note 52 supra.
59. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
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denced in Scheuer, indicates that Yaselli should no longer be viewed as
strong Supreme Court precedent for an absolute quasi-judicial immuni-
ty.
In spite of the questions about the appropriateness of an absolute
prosecutorial immunity stemming from Scheuer, some courts continue to
treat the issue as settled by precedent and refuse to examine the specific
factual context in which the immunity is asserted.60 Pre-Scheuer cases
typically considered the office of prosecutor to be vested with "a vast
quantum of discretion," 61 which must be protected in order to permit
prosecutors to serve the public's best interest. Opinions frequently
relied upon the traditional policy arguments which are advanced in
support of immunity for public officials in general: the importance of
prompt and fearless decision-making, the danger of influencing officials
by threat of lawsuit, the deterrent effect upon those considering entering
public life, and the drain on the time of officials in defending frivolous
suits. 62 None of these arguments, however, distinguishes between an
absolute and a qualified immunity, nor offers an explanation for treating
prosecutors differently from other members of the executive branch.63
It is of course important for any public officer to feel that he may
act decisively and without intimidation in the performance of his official
functions.6 4  The problems concerning the deterrent effects and time
drains also appear applicable to all officials. Thus, in terms of the
policy reasons which have been relied upon as a rationale for protecting
public officials from civil suit, it makes no difference whether the
particular officer involved is a high-ranking executive, a low-ranking
executive, a policeman, a legislator, or a judge. Any one of those
individuals who does not make decisions when necessary does not fully
and faithfully perform the duties of his office. Consequently, the
traditional rationales tend to prove too much when one is concerned not
60. See Tyler v. Witkowski, 511 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1975); Imbler v. Pachtman, 500
F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 85-86 (7th Cir.
1975).
61. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 590 (3d Cir. 1966).
62. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335 (1871); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 590 n.9 (3d Cir. 1966); cf. Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). See also Jaffe, Damage Actions, supra note 2, at 219-
22; Jennings, supra note 1, at 271-72; Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts,
66 HAv. L. REv. 1285, 1295 n.54 (1953).
63. Indeed, the difficulties with the rationale are well illustrated by the fact that the
Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes employed the traditional policy reasons to support
its decision that executive officials should have only qualified immunity. 416 U.S. 232,
241-42 (1974); see Note, Official Immunity, supra note 3, at 577.
64. See Jaffe, Damage Actions, supra note 2, at 219-22.
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with public officials in general, but with a specific segment of that entire
group. The public policy rationale does not suffice to explain why
judges have been given absolute immunity while executive officials are
shielded by only a qualified protection. That rationale, therefore, pro-
vides little insight into the question of which type of immunity the quasi-
judicial officer should have.
While some courts, then, have not dealt squarely with the implica-
tions of the trend away from absolute immunity for all public officials
illustrated in Scheuer, there has been an erosion of the immunity afford-
ed prosecutors. That erosion has been accomplished through a narrow-
ing of the category of activities in which prosecutors enjoy the protection
of immunity. In 1974, a federal district court was able to identify "a
growing trend toward determining the applicability of quasi-judicial
immunity by analyzing the nature of the activity being performed."'65
Where functions are "closely aligned" with the judicial process-such as
the prosecution of trials and grand jury proceedings-an absolute im-
munity still shields prosecutors. Where, however, the nature of the
activity is further removed from the actual courtroom process, the
immunity is qualified like that of other executive officials. 66  Thus,
courts have refused to allow a defense of absolute immunity for prosecu-
tors for acts done while directing police investigative activity,67 commit-
ting perjury when questioned by a judge,68 and ordering illegal wire-
taps. 9
A pre-Scheuer case decided by then Circuit Judge, now Justice
Stevens illustrates this functional approach to the applicability of abso-
lute prosecutorial immunity. In Hampton v. City of Chicago,7 0 mem-
bers of the Black Panther party brought a section 1983 action against
fourteen police officers and several state's attorneys following a raid on
the apartment of a Black Panther member. Two residents of the
apartment were killed in the raid.7 1  The plaintiffs alleged that two
state's attorneys "planned the raid and agreed to use excessive and
deadly force" against the residents, for the purpose of depriving the
plaintiffs of their first amendment rights. The district court denied a
65. Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F. Supp. 1228, 1230 (D.D.C. 1974).
66. Id.; see Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
67. Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see Dodd v. Spokane County,
393 F.2d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 1968); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536-38 (9th Cir.
1965).
68. Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D.D.C. 1974).
69. Brukhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
70. 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).
71. Id. at 605.
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motion to dismiss filed by the police officers, but dismissed the actions
against the state's attorneys.' 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
the district court's dismissal of the case against the state's attorneys,
disagreeing with the lower court's holding that the prosecutors were
absolutely immune.73 The court looked closely at the alleged conduct
to determine whether it was the type of "quasi-judicial" activity which is
accorded immunity, or whether it was more closely akin to police
investigatory activity.7 4 Rejecting the argument of the state's attorneys
that evidence gathering through such a raid "is so closely related to the
presentation of evidence at trial that it should also be clothed with
immunity,"7 5 the court held that planning and executing the raid has no
greater immunity than other police activities. 6
The functional approach illustrated in Hampton and more recent
cases 77 is consistent with the holding in Scheuer: if police officers and
executive officials are protected by only a qualified immunity, and
judges still enjoy absolute immunity, then the scope of prosecutorial
immunity should depend on how closely the challenged activity is linked
to the purely judicial process. No government official has ever been
immune from liability for private or personal torts by virtue of his
office,7 8 and the inquiry into whether the challenged act was among
those protected official duties must be made in every case.79 Moreover,
granting an absolute immunity to prosecutors for acts normally within
the sphere of police function might encourage an unhealthy assumption
of new roles by zealous district attorneys.
The functional approach, then, provides a sensible way to examine
the questions left after Scheuer. This approach, however, is not free
72. See id. at 605-06.
73. Id. at 607. The district court had relied on the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1966), to dismiss the action. The
court of appeals first held that state officials cannot be immunized against a section 1983
claim by a state statute, 484 F.2d at 607, and went on to hold that the state's attorneys
could not invoke an absolute common law immunity in these circumstances. Id. at 609.
74. Id. at 608.
75. Id. at 609.
76. Id. The court noted that the prosecutors' conduct might be characterized in
various ways. The complaints might have been read as charges that the state's attorneys
planned to have the police kill the victims. Id. at 608. The defendants, on the other
hand, urged that they were "charged with nothing more than the drafting of a search
warrant which the raiding officers executed ....... Id.
77. See cases cited in notes 65-69 supra.
78. PRossER 987.
79. Even judges can claim no immunity for acts done totally in the absence of
jurisdiction. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 350-52 (1871); see McGlasker
v. Calton, 397 F. Supp. 525 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
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from problems. First, there may be considerable difficulty in drawing
the line between the judicial (and thus absolutely protected) function of
the prosecutor and those activities more properly classed with his execu-
tive function. It should be recalled that the state's attorneys in Hamp-
ton argued that the apartment raid was part of their evidence-gathering
function which could not be separated from the presentation of evidence
at trial.8 0 Where the challenged conduct is perjury or the actual direc-
tion of an investigation, the functional approach operates smoothly. As
cases involving the questioning of potential witnesses or defendants, plea
bargaining, or calendaring trials, for example, reach the courts, the line-
drawing may become extremely difficult. Furthermore, an unduly
restrictive scope of absolute immunity might have a distorting impact on
the way a prosecutor performs his duties.8 1
A much more difficult problem with the functional approach is
highlighted by the Hilliard and Imbler cases discussed above. 82 Both
involved conduct which could in no way be characterized as part of a
prosecutor's executive, as opposed to judicial duties. Neither eliciting
testimony at trial nor the decision on what evidence should be intro-
duced at trial can be termed anything but intimately related to the
judicial process. Correctly applying the functional approach, the Im-
bier majority deemed Prosecutor Pachtman's acts "an 'integral part of
the judicial process,' "83 and granted him absolute immunity. But the
Imbler dissent84 and the Sixth Circuit in Hilliard85 would not permit the
prosecutor to enjoy an absolute immunity in the performance of these
activities. Such improper conduct, said the judges, was entirely outside
the scope of a prosecutor's duties.86
This conclusion is a misapplication of the functional approach
and of the Scheuer rationale, and illustrates that the functional approach
cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the question of the appropriate
scope of prosecutorial immunity. Looking to the propriety of the
challenged conduct to determine whether it is "quasi-judicial" and thus
80. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
81. Thus, if a prosecutor knows that he is absolutely immune for certain courtroom-
related activities, he might be encouraged to concentrate on that part of his job, to the
detriment of those executive functions which he should also perform.
82. See notes 40-53 supra and accompanying text.
83. 500 F.2d at 1302, quoting Marlowe v. Coakley, 404 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1968);
see Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1975) (decision to prosecute within scope of
"prosecutorial discretion").
84. 500 F.2d at 1304 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
85. Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1975).
86. Id. at 1350; Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir.) (Kilkenny,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 945 (1975).
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absolutely protected misses the point. Certainly, any type of miscon-
duct cannot be said to fall within a prosecutor's legitimate duties-
quasi-judicial or executive. Accordingly, distinguishing on this basis
between acts that fall inside and those that fall outside the protected
sphere becomes useless as a guide for courts or prosecutors.8 7
Such an analysis is too narrow. It is not helpful to distinguish
between conduct which is proper and that which is not.88 Single acts do
not define the boundaries of a prosecutor's duties; rather, the boundaries
are defined in broader terms. If an analysis based on public policy
tends to provide a justification for absolute immunity for all public
officials, 9 the Hilliard analysis moves too far in the other direction and
tends to provide a justification for removing absolute immunity from all
public officials. Moreover, using the propriety of the challenged con-
duct as the litmus for determining whether an absolute or a qualified
immunity will apply is inappropriate because it fails to face up to the
clear implication of Scheuer. There are specific incidences of prosecu-
torial conduct which the courts are no longer disposed to shield with an
absolute immunity, but those acts occur both in the executive and the
judicial capacities of the prosecutor. In Hilliard, the court fashioned an
unworkable distinction based on an after-the-fact examination of the
propriety of the challenged conduct in order to remove the immunity for
acts which were clearly entwined with the judicial process itself. It
should have squarely confronted the question left open by Scheuer, and
decided that prosecutors are to be afforded only a qualified immunity.90
Such a result would be consistent with the trend away from absolute
official immunity that Scheuer reflects.91
87. An argument similar to that proposed in Hilliard has been made in the context
of respondeat superior in tort law. Masters often contend that it was not in the scope of
their servants' duties to act negligently; hence the master should not be held vicariously
liable. These contentions have not been accepted, and masters cannot escape liability on
these grounds. See PRossFas § 70, at 461. Similarly, a master is liable for the
intentional tort of his servant "where its purpose, however misguided, is wholly or in part
to further the master's business." Id. at 464. See generally Brill, The Liability of an
Employer for the Wilful Torts of His Servants, 45 Cm.-KET L. REV. 1 (1968).
88. Judge Learned Hand criticized a similar argument. "A moment's reflection
shows, however, that that cannot be the meaning of the limitation without defeating the
whole doctrine." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 949 (1950).
89. See text following note 64 supra.
90. Indeed, the result reached in Hilliard might be interpreted as granting only a
qualified immunity to the prosecutor. If one reads the court's holding that the deliberate
withholding of exculpatory evidence is an act in bad faith, the result would have been the
.same as that reached on a qualified immunity analysis. The court, however, does not
speak in terms of good faith.
91. See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
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The proper inquiry, then, is not into the specific acts of a prosecu-
tor in any given case, but into the total prosecutorial function. After
Scheuer it is clear that the modem policy rationale alone does not justify
an absolute immunity for any government official. To determine
whether a prosecutor should be entitled to an absolute immunity derived
from the judicial attributes of -his office, his role must be examined in
light of the historical justifications for judicial-as opposed to
executive-immunity.
The Historical Foundations of Judicial Immunity
The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity has been established at
least since 1607,92 and some elements of the concept were formulated
two centuries prior to that date.9" Since that time there have been no
substantial changes in the rule, which was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in 1871. An examination of the early English
cases suggests two broad characteristics of the judicial officer's - role
which guided the original development of the absolute immunity doc-
trine. In order to decide whether the prosecutor falls within the scope
of the doctrine, it should be determined whether his duties possess those
two oharacteristics. First, however, a brief sketch of the historical
justifications for judicial immunity is in order.
In the very early common law the judicial immunity doctrine was
not recognized at all. 5 When the concept did gain acceptance, its basis
92. See Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1607).
93. See 6 HOLDSWORTH 235-36.
94. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871). The first Supreme Court
case to deal with the doctrine of judicial immunity was Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7
Wal.) 523 (1868). In that case the Court held that it was a "general principle
applicable to all judicial officers, that they are not liable to a civil action for any judicial
act done within their jurisdiction." Id. at 535. Some crucial elements of the common
law doctrine relating to jurisdiction were not clearly accepted in Brigham, however, and
it was not until the Bradley decision that it was explicit that the same common law
doctrine that had been developed in England would also be the law in the United States.
95. 6 HOLnswoRTl 234-35. Since there was nothing that could properly be called
an appeal from court to court known to the early common law, a principal means of
attacking a judgment of an inferior court was a complaint against the judge. The
procedure involved what was known as a complaint of false judgment. The unsuccessful
litigant would first obtain a writ which generally commanded the sheriff to have a record
made of the proceedings; then the record would be presented to the justices of the
superior court and a debate would ensue, not between the two original litigants, but
between the complainant and one or more representatives of the inferior court. Finally,
it was up to the justices to decided whether the inferior court's judgment should stand. If
the justices decided that the judgment of the inferior court should be annulled, the court
was forced to pay damages to the complainant and the judge sometimes lost the right to
hold court. See id. at 213-14 & n.1, 235; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 664, 666-67 (2d ed. 1923).
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was formulated in terms of the sanctity of the records of courts of
record. 96 The distinction between courts that maintained official
records and those that did not began to fade following the 1607 decision
by Lord Coke in Floyd v. Barker. 7 In that decision, the rationale for
absolute judicial immunity was couched for the first time in terms of
what now are deemed traditional policy arguments. Coke noted that,
"insomuch as the Judges of the realm have the administration of justice,
under the King, to all his subjects," they should not be answerable
before another court, regardless of their good faith or motives, 98 "for
they are only to make an account to God and the King, and not to
answer to any suggestion in the Star-Chamber."99 The reasons for that
conclusion sound as if they were written today: "[F]or this would tend
to the scandal and subversion of all justice. And those who are the
most sincere, would not be free from continual calumniations ... .100
By the early to mid-nineteenth century, courts were able to state
that it was a principle of the law that no action would lie against a
superior court judge for any judicial act, even though it was alleged that
he had acted with a malicious motive.101 While this shift to a public pol-
96. In contrast to "courts not of record," the courts of record maintained rolls of the
proceedings which were considered "such high and super-eminent authority" that their
truth could not be called into question. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAws OF ENGLAND 24 (16th ed. 1825). To prevent any questioning of the record itself,
judges were protected from any liability for acts done during the trial. 5 HOLDSWORa-
157-58; 6 HoLDswoRTH at 235; cf. Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1607). For
a discussion of the political reasons behind the emphasis upon distinctions between courts
of record and courts not of record, see 5 HoLDswORTH 157-60.
97. 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1607).
98. Id. at 1307 ("Mhe reason . . .why a Judge, for anything done by him as
Judge, . . . shall not be drawn in question before any other Judge, for any surmise of
corruption, except before the King himself, is for this; the King himself is de lure to
deliver justice to all his subjects; and for this, that he himself cannot do it to all persons,
he delegates his power to his Judges .... ) (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Fray v. Blackburn, 122 Eng. Rep. 217 (K.B. 1863) (allegation that judge
maliciously refused to impose costs upon the losing party in earlier trial); Scott v.
Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220 (1868) (slander); Taaffe v. Downes (Ire. C.P. 1813),
reprinted, Calder v. Halket, 13 Eng. Rep. 12, 15 n.(a) (P.C. 1840) (assault and false
imprisonment). The holding and rationale of Floyd v. Barker had been strengthened
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For example, in the frequently
cited case of Hamond v. Howell, 86 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1677), it was held that,
although it had been judicially determined that a judge's actions were illegal, a civil
action for damages would not lie against him. The point takes on added significance in
light of the facts of the case: the judge involved was merely a magistrate who, however,
was performing acts in the character of a judge. "IT]he bringing of the action," said the
court, "was a greater offence than the fining of the plaintiff, and committing of him for
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icy rationale for absolute judicial immunity is unquestioned, it is impor-
tant to recognize that it occurred gradually. In Floyd v. Barker, for ex-
ample, although the case was decided on public policy grounds, the
court was nonetheless quick to point out that a court of record was in-
volved in the case. °2
The early emphasis on sanctity of the records in the development of
judicial immunity suggests the first important attribute of the judicial
process which should be examined. The origins of absolute immunity
for judges lay in the need to protect the formality, and hence the
legitimacy, of judicial proceedings. In the courts of record, the pro-
ceedings were "enrolled for a perpetual memory and testimony,"' 03 were
open to the public, and were conducted in a formal setting. A dissatis-
fied suitor could, of course, attack the record by writ of error through
the early appeals processes,"0 4 but "the common law had learnt to draw
a distinction between the correctness of a judge's decision and the
rectitude of his conduct."' 0 5  To permit an unhappy litigant to go
behind the record and challenge the judge's conduct of the proceedings
would undermine the dignity of the process °0 and damage the claim of
the common law courts to legitimacy as a mechanism for the resolution
of disputes.
As noted above, the common law courts continued to take cogni-
zance of the distinction based on formal records long after Floyd v.
Barker signaled the shift to a modem public policy rationale.1Tr This
reluctance to discard the distinction apparently was unnecessary to
maintain the formality and dignity of court proceedings once judicial
non-payment; and ... it was a bold attempt against the Government and justice in
general." Id. at 1036-37; accord, Groenvelt v. Burwell, 91 Eng. Rep. 1202 (K.B. 1700).
102. Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1306-07 (KIB. 1607). Holdsworth points
out, however, that Lord Coke, in his opinion, "was exaggerating" the distinction "in
order to use it as one of the foundations of his arguments for the supremacy of the
common law, and as a means to depress such rival courts as the court of Admiralty, and
the ecclesiastical courts." 5 HoLDswoRTa 159-60. It can thus be argued that political,
and not practical or historical, reasons underlay the maintenance of the distinction. See
id.
103. THE DIcTIoNARY OF ENGLISH LAW 526 (E. Jowitt ed. 1959).
104. See 6 HOLDSWORTH 236.
105. Id. at 235; see 2 F. PoLLoCK & F. MArmAND, supra note 95, at 668-69.
106. For a discussion of the importance of the dignity of the proceedings, see .Taaffe
v. Downes (Ire. C.P. 1813), reprinted, Calder v. Halket, 13 Eng. Rep. 12, 15 n.(a), at
18 (P.C. 1840).
107. In Rex v. Skinner, 98 Eng. Rep. 529 (K.B. 1772), counsel for a judge charged
with slandering a grand jury referred to the fact that a court of record was involved. In
Groenvelt v. Burwell, 91 Eng. Rep. 1202, 1211-12 (K.B. 1700), the court stressed the
fact that a court of record was involved, although the power of the court to fine and
imprison was the key inquiry.
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immunity was justified on policy grounds, and may be explained by
political considerations.' Even if the records were absent, the princi-
pal elements which contributed to their "sanctity"-decision-making in
a formal setting, a forum open to public inspection, the presentation of
all sides of an issue, and proceedings witnessed by all parties in
interest-remained.
To determine if prosecutors should be entitled to an absolute
immunity on the basis of a similar need to protect the dignity and
formality of prosecutorial functions, those functions must be closely
scrutinized. It is clear that many of the activities which fall within the
sphere of the prosecutor's duties do not involve anything near the
formality which is inherent in any judicial proceeding. It is not unusual
for a statute to give the prosecutor responsibility for reviewing evidence,
instituting proceedings, drawing up indictments, and conducting crimi-
nal trials.1 9 In order to carry out those tasks, the prosecutor must
engage in a number of activities which, though not expressly provided
for in a statute, are undeniably included within the scope of his duties.
For instance, the duty to conduct criminal trials involves such activities
as interviewing witnesses, conducting investigations in preparation for
trial, collecting evidence, conducting depositions and other modes of
discovery, as well as the actual questioning of witnesses at the trial
itself." 0
Most of these activities necessarily are not conducted with a high
degree of formality, and it is not suggested here that they should be. To
the contrary, efficient performance of these activities requires far less
formality. What is meant to be suggested is that such activities present
more opportunities for concealed errors and misconduct than does a
formal judicial proceeding, thus permitting the question whether the
same degree of protection that was established originally to protect the
sanctity of the records should be afforded officials who do not operate
under the same degree of openness and formality. Moreover, the
prosecutorial role is essentially that of an advocate and not that of an
impartial arbiter of disputes. The need to protect the dignity and
legitimacy of the prosecutor's function does not seem nearly so weighty
as does the same need in the context of the judicial function. Thus,
prosecutors should not be entitled to an absolute immunity on the basis
of this characteristic of the judicial process.
108. See note 102 supra.
109. See, e.g., CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 26500-02 (West 1968).




The second important characteristic of traditional absolute judicial
immunity was the requirement that the official seeking protection from
civil suit have performed a "judicial act." Although the formal distinc-
tion between courts of record and those not of record was early
displaced by a modem public policy rationale, and the scope of judicial
immunity for judicial acts and opinions performed within the officer's
jurisdiction was broad,111 the sine qua non of the doctrine remained the
requirement that a judicial act be performed.112 Whether there are
special attributes of the "judicial act" which justify an absolute immuni-
ty for judges apart from the modem public policy rationale is not clear.
Unless and until the Supreme Court undertakes to review its decision in
Pierson v. Ray,"13 however, it must be assumed that "judicial acts" are
entitled to an absolute protection.
The common law understanding of the term required an act, upon
consideration of facts and circumstances, which imposed liability or
affected the rights of others.'" 4  Does the prosecutor, then, perform
111. The immunity was applied not only to judges of courts of general and superior
jurisdiction, but equally to those of inferior courts of limited jurisdiction. See notes 96-
102 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the rule exempted from liability not only
judges of the superior common law courts, but also equity judges, justices of the peace,
and coroners. See, e.g., Dicas v. Brougham, 174 Eng. Rep. 106 (Ex. 1833) (equity
judges); Harman v. Tappenden, 102 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1801) (quasi-judicial officers
of fishermen's guild); Rex v. Cox, 97 Eng. Rep. 562 (K.B. 1759) (justices of the peace);
Thomas v. Churton, 121 Eng. Rep. 1150 (Q.B. 1862); Garnett v. Ferrand, 108 Eng. Rep.
576 (K.B. 1827) (coroners). The coroner at common law held a much more significant
office than does his counterpart in the United States today. He exercised more power,
and the coroner's court was one of record. It was well settled in the common law that in
holding an inquest the coroner was performing a judicial duty. See also Duke of
Newcastle v. Clark, 129 Eng. Rep. 518, 530 (C.P. 1818) (still another extension of the
doctrine).
112. That requirement was, of course, carried over into the American case law. See,
e.g., Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 535 (1868) ("judicial officers . . . are
not liable . . . for any judicial act done within their jurisdiction"); Griffith v. Slinkard,
146 Ind. 117, 122, 44 N.E. 1001, 1002 (1896) ("no public officer is responsible . . . for
a judicial determination,. . . however malicious the motive which produced it").
113. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
114. See The Queen v. Corporation of Dublin, 2 L.R. Ir. 371, 376-77 (1878). Similar
definitions are found in many works and cases. See 1 J. BOUVIER, BOUVIER's LAw
DICrlONARY AND CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 116 (8th ed. F. Rawles 3d rev. 1914) ("[A
judicial act is] [ain act performed by a court touching the rights of parties or property
brought before it . . . by ministerial acts." This definition is too narrow in one sense
since it refers to acts performed by a court, and it is clear that even in the early common
law judicial acts were deemed to be performed by non-judges.); cf. The Queen v. Local
Gov't Bd. for Ire., 2 Ir. R. 349, 383 (1902) (defining judicial acts as those "done in the
exercise, or assumed exercise, of jurisdiction, as distinguished from any other authority")
(emphasis in original); In re Local Gov't Bd., 16 L.R. Ir. 150, 159 (1885). See also 2 T.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF TORTS 795 (3d ed. 1906).
[Vol. 1976:95
QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
"judicial acts" as they were known to the common law? It has been
noted that many cases tend to state the prosecutor's function in conclu-
sory terms."15 Some courts have been more specific, holding that the
prosecutor, in deciding whether a particular prosecution shall be insti-
tuted or followed up, performs much the same function as a grand jury,
which is protected by absolute immunity in common law actions.'10 The
115. See Yaseli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 404 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S.
503 (1927) (where the reference was simply to the fact that the prosecutor "exercises
important judicial functions").
116. See Downey v. Allen, 36 Cal. App. 2d 269, 97' P.2d 515 (1939); Smith v.
Parman, 101 Kan. 115, 165 P. 663 (1917). (There apparently are no reported section
1983 actions.) Accordingly, it has been argued that prosecutors should be protected by
absolute immunity owing to the close analogy between prosecutorial functions and those
of the grand jury. See Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per
curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927). Despite the similarities, the differences between the
nature of the prosecutorial function and the grand jury function are significant for
immunity purposes. Acting as "an arm of the court," the grand jury proceeds in a
formal setting, determines the facts, and is empowered to indict. These functions have
been held to constitute a judicial inquiry. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617
(1960). One of the most valuable functions of the grand jury has been to "stand
between the prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the charge was
founded upon credible testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will." Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906). In so doing, the grand jury stands in a position similar
to that of the magistrate who determines probable cause prior to issuing a search or
arrest warrant. The Supreme Court has stated that the main thrust of the fourth
amendment is the protection that exists in its requirement that the inferences which may
be drawn from evidence "be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate." Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). As the magistrate protects against the overzeal-
ous police officer, the grand jury acts as a "neutral and detached" body which serves as a
watchdog over the sometimes overzealous prosecutor. Thus, although the grand jury
does not determine final liability in the same fashion as does a judge, it appears to affect
rights much more intimately than does a prosecuting attorney. Moreover, the grand jury
exists as an arm of the court while the prosecutor is related to the court only insofar as
every attorney is so associated. See note 121 infra and accompanying text. But cI.
Bricker v. Michigan Parole Bd., 18 CRiM. L. REP. 2362 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 1975).
Even if the grand jury does not perform "judicial acts" so as to bring it within the
protection of judicial immunity, there is a separate rationale for its absolute immunity.
There has been a long-standing policy in the law that grand jury proceedings should be
conducted in secret. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399
(1959); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958). Secrecy
would, to a large extent, be destroyed if grand jurors were not shielded from civil suits
insofar as any proof of an allegation would entail disclosure of what occurred during the
grand jury proceedings. It has been said that "[n]othing could be more destructive of
the workings of our grand jury system or more hostile to its historic status," than to
allow intrusion into the "indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings." United States
v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943). The purposes of the secrecy requirement
include: (1) a desire to keep the grand jury a "dispassionate forum," free from external
pressures, (2) an assurance that witnesses will testify freely, (3) a need to protect
innocent persons from intimidation, and (4) the necessity of protecting all persons who
appear before one-sided hearings, without opportunity to reply. See, e.g., United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860, 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Coblentz v.
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prosecutor's "judicial functions" do not, however, appear to be of the
type that impose liability or affect the rights of others in the sense that
the functions of a judge do so. It is true that a prosecutor has enormous
discretionary power in deciding whether or not an individual who has
been arrested should be prosecuted,"17 and that "the decision whether to
file formal charges is a vitally important stage in the criminal
process."'118 Nevertheless, such a decision does not appear to be a
judicial act as known to the common law. It does not initially impinge
upon the rights of the defendant who has already been arrested by the
police,119 nor does it impose final liability on the defendant since a
grand jury must determine if there exists probable cause for the prosecu-
tion, and a trial judgment must be had before there is any final liability
imposed. 120  Moreover, most cases have indicated that the prosecutor is
an officer of the court only to the extent that all attorneys are officers of
the court and that he is not a part of the court by virtue of his office.' 2'
State, 164 Md. 558, 566-67, 166 A. 45, 49 (1933). Indeed, in the federal system, the
secrecy requirement has been embodied in statute. See FED. R. CluM. P. 6(e).
117. See notes 122-30 infra and accompanying text.
118. THn PRasmENT's CoMMIssIoN ON LAw ENFoRcEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTicE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COuRTS 5 (1967).
119. For a discussion of the discretionary aspects of police work, see K. DAvis,
POLICE DIsCRETION (1975). See also Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the
Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE
L.J. 543 (1960); LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law (pts. 1-2), 1962
Wis. L. REv. 104, 179; McGowan, Rule-making and the Police, 70 MIcH. L. R.v. 659
(1972); Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971 DUKE L.I. 717.
It might be argued that a prosecutorial decision not to prosecute imposes final
liability just as a judge's dismissal of charges or a jury's not-guilty verdict does. Some
section 1983 claims against prosecutors have been based on alleged failures to take
action. Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1975) (failing to prosecute assault
charges); cf. Curry v. Jensen, 523 F.2d 387, 388 (9th Cir. 1975) (charging a misde-
meanor rather than a felony). Such an argument has considerable appeal; however, the
same reasoning might be applied to the decision of a policeman not to arrest and thus be
the basis for an absolute immunity for all police officers.
120. See, e.g., Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4-
15 (4th ed. 1974). Even in those states which initiate criminal proceedings by having
the prosecutor file an information with the trial court, the defendant has been afforded a
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause. Id. at 9-10.
121. See Fleming v. Hance, 153 Cal. 162, 94 P. 620 (1908); State v. DeStasio, 49
N.J. 247, 260 n.2, 229 A.2d 636, 634 n.2, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967); McDonald
v. Goldstein, 273 App. Div. 649, 79 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1948). It has been held that public
officials enjoy no immunity from suit solely by virtue of their relationship to the judicial
system. McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3-4 (4th Cir. 1972); Scarrella v. Spannaus,
376 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D. Minn. 1974).
Some courts have indicated that the prosecuting attorney is a member of the
executive branch of government, and hence has no greater connection. with the judicial
branch than being the foremost representative of the executive in the enforcement of the
criminal law. See, e.g., People v. Goodspeed, 22 Cal. App. 3d 690, 705 n.4, 99 Cal.
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Another argument, which draws on the discretion notions of the
modem public policy rationale, might be advanced in support of a
prosecutor's claim to the performance of "judicial acts." Prosecutors,
like other quasi-judicial officers, exercise a broad discretion in the
performance of their duties.' 22 The most significant aspect of that
discretion, of course, is the power to decide whether or not to prosecute
a particular defendant at all.1 3  It can be urged that the discretion
available to a prosecutor in deciding whether to prosecute makes his
decision an act in the nature of one performed by a judge.124
That a prosecutor "can exercise so large an influence on disposi-
tions that involve the penal sanction, without reference to any norms but
those that they may create for themselves"' 25 is a matter of concern.
How does the prosecutor go about exercising such a large influence?126
How does he handle his discretionary power? The following questions
have been suggested as some of the ones the prosecutor considers: What
would be the result of a prosecution? Would it be a waste of time?
Would it be expensive to the state? Would it be unfair to the defend-
ant? Would it serve any good purpose to society in general? Would it
have good publicity value? Would it cause political problems? If the
offender is a friend, would it be a fair thing to do to him?12 7
These types of questions indicate the number of pragmatic consid-
erations the prosecutor deals with before making a decision whether or
not to prosecute. The predominance of these practical matters distin-
Rptr. 696, 706 n.4 (1972); State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 96 A.2d 63 (1953). Of course,
most quasi-judicial officers are nominally members of the executive branch. Other
courts, indeed some legislatures, have deemed the prosecutor to be a member of the
judicial branch. E.g., Cawley v. Warren, 216 F.2d 74, 76 (7th Cir. 1954).
122. For an interesting discussion of the extent and nature of discretionary immunity
in general, including both the judicial and quasi-judicial aspects, see Jaffe, Damage
Actions, supra note 2, at 218-25.
123. See F. MILLER, PROSECUTIoN-THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME 154-345 (1970).
124. Cf. 2 T. COOLEY, supra note 114, at 799-800.
125. Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1102
(1952).
126. A number of authors have commented upon the practice of the prosecutor. See,
e.g., Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE LJ. 1
(1932); Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. AM. INST. CrIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 770 (1933); Brezner, How the Prosecuting Attorney's Office Processes
Complaints, 27 DETROIT LAW. 3 (1959); Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of
the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEo. L.J. 1030 (1967); Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discre-
tion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 174 (1965); Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in
Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the A.B.A., 71 MICH. L. REv. 1145
(1973). See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 120, at 803-64;
F. MILLER, supra note 123.
127. Baker, supra note 126, at 770-71.
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guishes the prosecutor's discretion from the judge's. 2 8 The judge, to be
sure, must also contend with a great many practical considerations;
however, the practical considerations dealt with by the judge are of a
different nature. The judge often considers such questions as whether
the trial would be a burden upon the courts or whether a particular
judicial action would serve a beneficial purpose for society in general. It
is clear, though, that he does not face the same types of external
pressures and pragmatic considerations which arise every day in the
prosecutor's office. Furthermore, those questions he does consider are
merely ancillary to the general power vested in him to impose liability or
affect the rights of the parties before him. Because the prosecutor does
not have that general power, his discretion in regard to whether the
machinery of the state's criminal processes should be put into motion is
more closely related to that of the private attorney who must face similar
pragmatic considerations in deciding whether it would be worthwhile to
bring a civil action on behalf of his client. If then, as the precedent
seems to indicate, the availability of an absolute immunity for a quasi-
judicial official should turn on whether his discretion is of such a nature
that it imposes liability or affects the rights of others,' 29 the prosecutor
cannot claim such protection.113
128. See Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 594 (3d Cir. 1966) (Freedman, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967).
129. In an action brought against a coroner, for example, it was pointed out that the
coroner did not act judicially "in holding an inquest, which is a mere finding and does
not establish rights, and therefore his authority lacks the first element of judicial power."
Delatte v. Genovese, 273 F. Supp. 654, 658 (E.D. La. 1967), quoting 18 AM. JuR. 2D
Coroners or Medical Examiners § 8 (1965); accord, Stults v. Board of Comm'rs, 168
Ind. 539, 81 N.E. 471 (1907); Cox v. Royal Tribe of Joseph, 42 Ore. 365, 71 P. 73
(1903).
130. It is important to note another distinction consistently observed by common law
courts between superior and inferior court judges, and the scope of the immunity af-
forded each. It was clear that neither was protected for acts performed completely
outside his jurisdiction. See 6 HOLDSWORTH 236. It was recognized that "[in such a case
the matter was not coram judice, the record could be traversed, and the judge was not
protected from the aggrieved litigant's action." Id. See also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1871). The distinction arose when the judge acted merely in
excess of his jurisdiction rather than wholly in the absence thereof. An act in excess of
jurisdiction was one in which the judge had jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case,
but exceeded his jurisdiction in regard to the persons over whom he had the power to
adjudicate or the punishments he had the power to impose. A superior court judge was
shielded by absolute immunity for such acts, his jurisdiction being presumed. See
Doswell v. Impey, 107 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1823) (commissioners of bankrupts not liable
for false imprisonment); Ackerley v. Parkinson, 105 Eng. Rep. 665 (K.B. 1815)
(ecclesiastical judge not liable for excommunication); Groenvelt v. Burwell, 91 Eng.
Rep. 1202 (K.B. 1700) (censors of College. of Physicians not liable for determination of
malpractice and imprisonment that followed). An inferior court judge was not so




The question posed at the outset of this Note was the extent to
courts is limited by definite restrictions of subject matter, persons, or place, nothing
being intended to be within the inferior courts' jurisdiction but that which is expressly
alleged); Winford v. Powell, 92 Eng. Rep. 357 (K.B. 1712). Consequently, in a case in
which both the superior and inferior court judges had subject matter jurisdiction, but
neither had jurisdiction over the parties, the superior court judge would be immune from
civil suit while the inferior court judge would not. Perkin v. Proctor, 95 Eng. Rep. 874
(K.B. 1768); Morse v. James, 125 Eng. Rep. 1089 (C.P. 1738); see 6 HOLDSWORTH 238-
40. Contra, McDaniel v. Harrell, 81 Fla. 66, 87 So. 631 (1921); Calhoun v. Little, 106
Ga. 336, 32 S.E. 86 (1898); Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 61 N.W. 1004 (1895);
Robertson v. Parker, 99 Wis. 652, 75 N.W. 423 (1898). The latter cases indicate that
the rule has not been universally accepted in the United States, and the trend of
authority has been that the same considerations that applied to superior court judges
should also apply to inferior court judges. See McGlasker v. Calton, 397 F. Supp. 525,
529-30 (M.D. Ala. 1975). The case of Calder v. Halket, 13 Eng. Rep. 12 (P.C. 1840),
resulted in an unusual holding. It was held that if the judge exceeds his jurisdiction
because of a mistake of fact, it must be shown by the plaintiff that the true facts were
either known, or ought to have been known, to him in order to be held liable. Otherwise
the maxim ignorantia facti excusat was held to apply. No other case has been found
which goes to such an extent.
The basis for the distinction was not clear in the English cases. One might surmise,
although it was not explicitly stated, that it was a pragmatic consideration based on the
fact that inferior court judges were answerable to higher authority, while superior court
judges, as representatives of the King, were not. See Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep.
1305, 1307 (K.B. 1607).
It has been suggested that a modern rationale be grounded on the fact that an
inferior court judge's decision may be appealed:
The inferior judicial officer is not excused for exceeding his jurisdiction
because, a limited authority only having been conferred upon him, he best
observes the spirit of the law by solving all questions of doubt against his
jurisdiction. If he errs in this direction, no harm is done, because he can
always be set right by the court having appellate authority over him, and he
can have no occasion to take hazards so long as his decision is subject to re-
view. 2 T. COOLEY, supra note 114, at 811.
Conversely, the superior court judge operates under a presumption that his duties should
be exercised with more liberty of action. Id. at 811-12. The American cases that have
discarded the distinction disapprove of Cooley's reasoning, and have contended that it is
illogical for the law to protect the one judge and not the other. Some courts, however,
have required that the inferior court judge act in good faith if he has exceeded his
jurisdiction. Broom v. Douglass, 175 Ala. 268, 57 So. 860 (1912); Thompson v.
Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 61 N.W. 1004 (1895); Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654
(1882); Robertson v. Parker, 99 Wis. 652, 75 N.W. 423 (1898).
In light of this long-adhered-to distinction, it must be recognized that the extension
of the absolute immunity of judges for acts done within the jurisdiction of their courts
into the area of quasi-judicial actions is not as facile as it might at first appear. It is
clear that judges of the inferior courts did not have a shield of protection as broad as that
afforded the superior court judges. Yet there can be no doubt that the inferior court
judges were still, after all, judges and were performing judicial acts in a formal setting.
See notes 103-08 supra and accompanying text. It does not seem to be at all so clear as
most courts have supposed that an officer such as a prosecutor, in whom, it is conceded,
there rests broad discretionary power, would be afforded protection as broad as that of
an inferior court judge. There appear to be no cases on the point at common law.
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which Scheuer v. Rhodes131 would redefine the scope of immunity for
quasi-judicial officials in section 1983 actions. Two facts were clear
immediately following Scheuer: (1) judges remained protected by abso-
lute immunity, and (2) a long line of cases had extended that absolute
immunity to shield prosecuting attorneys, used here as the model quasi-
judicial official.
In order to decide if a particular quasi-judicial official is absolutely
immune from suit under section 1983, it appears necessary to determine
whether his duties are of such a nature that he may be deemed a judicial
official as that term was understood when the traditional judicial im-
munity doctrine was established. 132  Under Scheuer, an executive offi-
cer who exercises discretion in the carrying out of his official duties is no
longer protected by the same immunity as that which shields a judge.1 33
Nonetheless, it does not seem entirely logical to assume that the scope of protection
afforded even an inferior court judge would be identical to that afforded a quasi-judicial
officer, especially in light of the common law emphasis on formality of the proceedings
and the understanding that a judicial act need be performed.
131. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
132. Compare Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
908 (1971), with Delatte v. Genovese, 273 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. La. 1967).
133. The Supreme Court's present attitude toward section 1983 and toward limitation
of the immunity defense should be viewed in light of other similar developments. It is
clear that the present decade has produced a revival not only of section 1983 but also of
other sections of the 1871 Civil Rights Act as well, particularly sections 1981 and 1982.
Of course, the Court's opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
which construed the reach of section 1982, must be viewed as a landmark decision.
Similarly, its decision in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S.
431 (1973), and such lower court decisions as Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp.,
498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974), made section 1981 a much more viable section in the
general area of racial discrimination.
With regard to the Court's attitude toward immunity, one need only examine some
of the cases decided and statutes passed in the 1960s which abolished tort immunity for
municipalities to obtain a sense of the judicial mood on the issue. There began during
that period "a minor avalanche of decisions repudiating municipal immunity," creating "a
radical change in the law." PROSSER § 131, at 985. In one of the most widely cited
cases, Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961), modified, 57 Cal. 2d 488, 370 P.2d 325, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1962), holding that
no level of state or local government could rely upon governmental immunity as a
defense against tort liability, the California Supreme Court recognized the erosion of
immunity through previous statutory and judicial developments and pointed out that its
decision was merely the "final step that carries to its conclusion an established legislative
and judicial trend." 55 Cal. 2d at 221, 359 P.2d at 463, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
Other significant decisions in this area include Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,
96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957), and Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18
Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S: 968 (1960). Several statutes
also abrogate governmental tort liability. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810 to 996.6
(West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85 §§ 1-101 to 10-101 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
Arvo Van Alstyne has written a series of articles on the issue. Van Alstyne,
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Accordingly, the question should no longer be focused merely on the
discretionary aspects of the duties, but also on whether these duties are
of such a nature as to be deemed judicial acts. It has been shown that a
prosecutor does not exercise such duties.134 The duties of other quasi-
judicial officials must be analyzed in the same manner to determine the
scope of their immunity.
In light of the modem public policy rationale for official immunity,
it seems clear that all governmental officials who must exercise discre-
tion in carrying out the duties of their offices should be protected from
civil suit by some type of immunity. In -the case of those quasi-judicial
officers, such as a prosecuting attorney, who do not perform acts which
impose liability or affect the rights of others, the immunity to be
afforded should be qualified. 135 At least until there is evidence that a
Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STANr. L.
REV. 163 (1963); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospec-
tus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 463 (1963); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A
Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919.
134. Because his office has been used as a model, it should be noted that the
prosecutor presents some unique difficulties in terms of his immunity from suit. Al-
though it has been suggested throughout this Note that the prosecutor should not receive
absolute immunity from suit by virtue of his role as a quasi-judicial officer, it could be
argued that he should be absolutely immune in his role as a participant in a judicial
proceeding. That all participants in a judicial proceeding are absolutely immune in
defamation actions is well established. See, e.g., PRossER § 114; Veeder, Absolute
Immunity In Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 CoLUM. L. REv. 463 (1909). In
England, the same absolute immunity protects a barrister from being held liable for
professional negligence during litigation. The immunity extends to work done when
litigation is pending, to acts performed while he is actually conducting the litigation, and
to the drawing of pleadings. A recent case extended that immunity to a solicitor who
conducted litigation. Rondel v. Worsley, [1966] 3 All E.R. 657 (C.A.).
Absolute immunity for counsel in American law has not been extended beyond the
area of defamation. Actions may be brought against attorneys for malicious prosecution
and for malpractice, for example, indicating that the English doctrine of absolute
immunity for attorneys in the conducting of litigation has not been accepted in this
country. See 2 PRAcTcING LAw INssrruE, PRoFESSIONAL MALPRACrCE ch. I (1967);
Drinker, Canons 28 and 29-An Appraisal, in PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 240 (T.
Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960); Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, in
PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 217 (T. Roady & W. Andersen eds. 1960).
It appears, therefore, that a prosecutor would not be immune from section 1983
liability by virtue of his role as a participant in a judicial proceeding. It does appear
that the possibility exists for a prosecutor to be liable under section 1983 and absolutely
immune in a defamation suit for the same action committed during a judicial proceeding.
In order for the possibility to arise, the plaintiff would have to allege that the
prosecutor's remarks deprived him of a constitutional right. Martin v. Merola, Civil No.
75-7113 (2d Cir. Feb. 5, 1976); Williams v. Gorton, Civil No. 74-2627 (9th Cir. Jan.
19, 1976); Tunnell v. Wiley, 514 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1975).
135. Using a different analysis from that suggested in this Note, the Supreme Court
has recently held that prosecutors are protected by an absolute immunity. Imbler v.
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non-absolute immunity imposes undue restraint upon official conduct or
deters good men from seeking office, it does not seem unreasonable to
require quasi-judicial officers to act in good faith in the exercise of their
discretion if they are to be exempt from a section 1983 suit. 36 Indeed,
as the Supreme Court has recognized, a good faith standard does not
impose an unfair burden upon a person in a responsible public office
which requires intelligence and judgment for the proper fulfillment of its
duties. "Any lesser standard would deny much of the promise of §
1983."'13
Pachtman, 44 U.S.L.W. 4250 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976). See note 11 supra for a discussion
of the decision's ramifications.
As noted above, see note 35 supra and accompanying text, the Scheuer Court
recognized the importance of some type of immunity for executive officials. The
decision to qualify that immunity, however, suggests that the Court considered unfound-
ed fears that anything less than absolute immunity "would seriously cripple the proper
and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the
government." Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
A qualified immunity for quasi-judicial officers would not be a totally new develop-
ment, despite the strong precedent for absolute immunity in the federal courts. 'The
considerable majority of the state courts take the position that there is no immunity
where the. . . officer does not act honestly and in good faith, but maliciously, or for an
improper purpose," PRossm § 132, at 989, even for those quasi-judicial officers who do
exercise judicial acts. Those cases have recognized that if the challenged act committed
is a judicial or quasi-judicial one, public policy requires that the quasi-judicial officer
should not be forced to respond in damages to a private individual for the honest exercise
of his judgment, however erroneous that judgment might be. Nevertheless, "in matters
of judgment and discretion they are liable . . . if they act wilfully, corruptly, or
maliciously." Vickers v. Motte, 109 Ga. App. 615, 618, 137 S.E.2d 77, 79-80 (1964),
quoting Price v. Owen, 67 Ga. App. 58, 60-61, 19 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1942); accord,
Tillotson v. Fair, 160 Kan. 81, 159 P.2d 471 (1945); Arnold v. Hubble, 18 Ky. L. Rptr.
947, 38 S.W. 1041 (1897); Taulli v. Gregory, 223 La. 195, 65 So. 2d 312 (1953); see
McManis, supra note 30, at 825-31. Contra, Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257
(4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951); Phelps v. Dawson, 97 F.2d 339 (8th
Cir. 1938); Nadeau v. Marchessault, 112 Vt. 309, 24 A.2d 352 (1942).
136. See PROssER § 132, at 989 ("no evidence of any undue restraint of official
conduct, or deterrence of good men from seeking office, in the states which do not
recognize the absolute immunity on the part of inferior officers"); Jaffe, Damage
Actions, supra note 2, at 216-17 (most officers who suffer any sort of liability are
indemnified by the state).
137. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). The Wood decision indicates
the difficulties that were created by the Scheuer holding in regard to the definition of
"good faith." The appropriate standard, according to the Wood majority, contains
elements of both a subjective and an objective test. The official must not only be acting
in good faith, "with a belief that he is doing right," but also his actions cannot be justified
by ignorance of "settled, indisputable law." Accordingly, if the official knew or
reasonably should have known that his actions would violate a person's constitutional
rights, or "if he took the action with the malicious intention" of violating constitutional
rights, he should not be immune from section 1983 liability. Id. at 321-22.
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